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As economic integration continues to deepen across developed economies the barriers to 
further integration are revealed as those located behind rather than at the borders of 
integrating states.  A concept that has, correspondingly, acquired increasing popularity in 
recent years is that of ‘mutual recognition.’  This concept is regarded by many as a way of 
furthering economic integration in sectors in which identified obstacles to integration are 
regarded as limiting productivity and economic development.  Using the European 
Services Directive1 as a case study, this article examines the concept of mutual recognition 
in order to better understand its limitations as well as its potential.  It is suggested that the 
more significant innovation in the Directive is the process of ‘mutual evaluation’ 
introduced by the Directive in Article 39.  Once again, the EU may be leading the way in 
dealing with barriers to trade. 
 
 
Introduction: Mutual Recognition’ or ‘Mutual Evaluation’? 
 
This article begins with a consideration of the concept of mutual recognition as it has 
developed in European Union law, particularly through the jurisprudence of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU).  Discussion then moves to examine the concept of 
mutual evaluation as set out in the ‘EU Services Directive.’2  It concludes by explaining why 
using mutual evaluation rather than mutual recognition may prove to be a more effective 
means of dealing with ‘barriers behind borders’, particularly in the area of services 
integration.    
 
Mutual Recognition and the Jurisprudence of the CJEU  
 
Cassis de Dijon and the Preliminary Ruling Mechanism 
In its strongest form, the concept of ‘mutual recognition’ is contained in the ‘Country of 
Origin Principle’ (CoOP).  In the field of EU law ‘mutual recognition’ was first set out as a 
                                                          
 I thank the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on a previous version of this article.  
1 European Parliament and the Council of the European Union (2006) Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on Services in the Internal Market [2006] OJ L376/36. 
2 European Parliament and the Council of the European Union (2006) Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on Services in the Internal Market [2006] OJ L376/36. 




principle of EU law by the European Court of Justice in a case concerning the importation 
of a French liqueur, Cassis de Dijon into Germany.3  The following discussion deals in some 
detail with the procedural history of this decision and the Court’s ruling.  This is done to lay 
bare the idiosyncratic nature of the ‘preliminary ruling’ mechanism.  It is this mechanism (if 
not solely then predominantly) that enables ‘negative harmonisation’ in the absence of 
‘positive harmonisation’ (as explained below).  It is argued that this mirroring of positive 
with negative harmonisation through the judicial means of a preliminary ruling is unique to 
the EU.  Using the EU as a model for negative harmonisation is therefore unlikely to succeed 
because the preliminary ruling structure is never and can never be transplanted successfully 
from the EU system to any other system.  The paper returns to this point below, in the 
discussion about ‘mutual evaluation.’  
 
Cassis was a ‘preliminary ruling’ matter.  REWE had sought authorisation from the German 
Federal Spirits Board 3  to import Cassis de Dijon into Germany.  Cassis was in free 
circulation in France and had, at most, an alcohol content of 20%.  Under German law 
however, spirits sold for consumption were required to have an alcohol content of at least 
32%.  The German authorities refused REWE the necessary permission to import Cassis into 
Germany and the latter sought judicial review of this administrative decision.  The German 
court ultimately hearing this matter stayed proceedings and sought a preliminary ruling 
from the European Court of Justice, under what was then Art. 177 EEC4 on two questions.  
The first question is the relevant one for present purposes: whether a statutory measure 
fixing a minimum alcohol content for spirits came within the meaning of ‘measure having 
equivalent effect’ set out in what was then Art.30 EEC5.  In effect, a national measure such 
as that in effect in Germany, would amount to a measure equivalent to an express 
quantitative restriction because goods that did not comply with this requirement would not 
be authorised for importation by the German authorities.  The Court answered this question 
affirmatively.  The ‘mutual recognition’ concept is contained in paragraph 14 of the 
judgment: 
 [14]…It therefore appears that the unilateral requirement imposed by the rules of a Member 
State of a minimum alcohol content for the purposes of the sale of alcoholic beverages 
constitutes an obstacle to trade which is incompatible with the provisions of Article 30 of 
the Treaty.  There is therefore no valid reason why, provided that they have been lawfully 
produced and marketed in one of the Member States, alcoholic beverages should not be 
introduced into any other Member State; the sale of such products may not be subject to a 
legal prohibition on the marketing of beverages with an alcohol content lower than the 
limit set by the national rules. (emphasis added) 
 
In other words, in the absence of overarching EU legislation, (to which Member State 
legislation would be subordinate: so-called ‘positive harmonisation’) Member States were 
required to recognise the legal framework governing the production and marketing of goods 
in the state of origin (so-called ‘negative harmonisation’).  This obligation however, was 
subject to what the Court referred to as ‘mandatory requirements’ (explained below).   
It is important to note the way in which the Court developed its reasoning in this decision 
and to understand why care needed to be taken with it.  The ‘preliminary ruling’ mechanism 
was and is the means by which a uniform interpretation of EU law (in the widest sense of 
that term) is safeguarded.  The final arbiter on such questions, as a result of the operation of 
what is now Article 267 is the Court of Justice.  It is settled, as a matter of EU law, 
international law and of Member State domestic law, that the CJEU has no jurisdiction to 
                                                          
3 Literally, the Federal Monopoly Administration for Spirits: English version of the Cassis judgment.  
4 Now article 267 TFEU. 
5 Now Art.34, TFEU. 




rule on the validity or scope of domestic law measures.  However, if we look closely at the 
language of Article 267 and the way it has been understood by both Member State domestic 
courts and the CJEU, this is less of a constraint on the latter than might first appear.  
 
A domestic court is only obliged to ask for a preliminary ruling on a question of EU law in 
circumstances where ‘a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment.’6  
Even then, there is a discretion allowed to intermediate courts (which may refer questions) 
that is denied courts of final appeal (which must refer such questions).  As a matter of its 
own domestic law, a Member State court will not refer a question to the CJEU for a 
preliminary ruling unless a ruling on that point is necessary for the Member State court to 
make a decision on a matter before it.  In making a preliminary ruling, such as in the Cassis 
case, for example, the CJEU will explain the meaning of EU law; stipulate the circumstances 
in which domestic measures will be incompatible with EU law; and explain the sort of 
behaviour on the part of Member States that would, and would not, be consistent with their 
obligations under EU law.  Having set out its ruling on the question of EU law referred to it, 
the CJEU will often conclude by noting that it is for the referring court to determine whether, 
in the instant case, the domestic measure in question is compatible with EU law.  In other 
words, the CJEU gives a ruling on a question of legal principle concerning the interpretation 
of EU law that is broader than the particular circumstances of the proceedings that gave rise 
to the reference for a preliminary ruling.  However, given that the referring court considers 
such a preliminary ruling necessary in order for it to make a decision, the broader statement 
of principle is, ineluctably, narrowed in its application in the particular case before the 
referring court.  As a matter of fact, if not law, a preliminary ruling on a question of EU law 
has the effect of altering the domestic legal landscape of the Member States.   
  
This is what happened in the Cassis case.  The CJEU set out the principle of ‘mutual 
recognition,’ in effect, as a principle of EU law.  In the same decision, the court set out the 
concept of ‘mandatory requirements.’7  This is an inexhaustive list of policy areas in which 
Member States may derogate from observing the principle of ‘mutual recognition’ while ever 
there is no measure at the EU level, harmonising the relevant law and regulatory practices 
of the Member States.  Derogating domestic measures, justified as ‘mandatory requirements’ 
were and are nonetheless subject to the EU principles of proportionality and non-
discrimination.   
 
A discussion of the practical challenges of giving effect to the principle of ‘mutual 
recognition’ must be left to another occasion.8  Suffice to say, for present purposes, the 
principle of ‘mutual recognition’ was formulated as a principle of EU law in the Cassis 
decision and became an essential tool of EU integration9.  As already indicated, the concept 
of ‘mutual recognition’ was applied in the first instance, to remove obstacles to the free 
                                                          
6 TFEU Article 267, para 2. 
7 See paragraph 8 of the Cassis judgment.  
8  Apart from the work of the Commission on giving effect to mutual evaluation specifically, and to the Directive more 
generally, implementation of the Directive as a whole has already been the subject of academic consideration: see H F  
Koeck and M M Karollus, The New Services Directive of the European Union: Hopes and Expectations from the Angle of 
a (Further) Completion of the Internal Market, Nomos, Vienna, 2008; F Breuss, G Fink and S Griller, Services 
Liberalisation in the Internal Market, Springer, Vienna, 2008; U Stelkens, W Weiss and M Mirschberger, The 
Implementation of the EU Services Directive: Transposition, Problems and Strategies, TMC Asser, The Hague, 2012.   
9 The concept has been the subject of considerable academic discussion, particularly since the promulgation of the Services 
Directive. See, for example, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 17, No. 5: Special issue: Mutual Recognition as a New 
Mode of Governance (Guest editor: Susanne K. Schmidt); F. Schioppa, The Principles of Mutual Recognition in the 
European Integration Process, Palgrave, USA, 2005; C. Janssens, The Principle of Mutual Recognition in EU Law, OUP, 
Oxford, 2013.    
 




movement of goods between Member States.  It was subsequently also applied to remove 
obstacles to the free movement of services and people.  Whereas the EEC treaty provisions 
were directed to the removal of trade barriers located at the border, ‘mutual recognition’ was 
directed to trade barriers located behind the borders.  The principle had greater relevance 
to domestic measures described as ‘indistinctly applicable’ measures: those measures that, 
in law applied to both domestically and imported goods alike but in practice placed a heavier 
burden on imported goods.  More correctly, the burden of indistinctly applicable measures 
falls more heavily on the producers in other Member States than on domestic producers.  
Consequently, such producers are discouraged from trying to produce for markets other 
than their domestic market and this, in turn, inhibits economic integration and the 
development of the internal market.  
 
Harmonisation from the EU Perspective 
 
As noted above however, the concept of ‘mutual recognition’ comes into play in the absence 
of overarching EU measures directed to the harmonisation of law and regulatory practice 
across the internal market ie, between Member States.  Harmonisation through the 
application of this concept has been referred to as ‘negative harmonisation.’  From the 
perspective of EU law, it is arguably, weaker than the process of ‘positive harmonisation’ by 
which the EU institutions develop measures to harmonise areas of law and regulatory 
practices across Member States.  The aim, in turn, of such measures is to facilitate the free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital, for the purpose of greater economic 
integration within the internal market; and for the corresponding welfare gains this ought 
to then generate more widely for EU citizens (and, indeed, third country nationals living in 
the EU).   
 
Harmonisation from the Member States’ Perspective 
 
From the perspective of the Member States however, an absence of EU legislation means 
that Member States have ultimate legislative competence in the field in question (in the 
Cassis case, for example, the field of regulating the alcohol content of a particular type of 
beverage).  This also means that they have a greater (but not an absolute) discretion 
concerning the extent to which they adjust their domestic law and regulatory practice 
according to the concept of ‘mutual recognition.’  The CJEU recognised this in the 
formulation of the judgment in Cassis.  On the one hand, the Court set out the primary 
obligation of Member States to mutually recognise the regulatory frameworks of other 
Member States which governed the production and release of goods onto the domestic 
market.  However, as noted earlier, the Court has no jurisdiction to pronounce on the validity 
or otherwise of domestic law and practice in the Member States.  When exercising its 
jurisdiction in the context of a preliminary ruling, the Court is simply expounding the 
meaning and interpretation of EU law.  The concept of ‘mutual recognition’ grew out of the 
Court’s explanation of the meaning of the phrase ‘measure having equivalent effect’ that 
formed part of Article 30, EEC: 
 
Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall, without 
prejudice to the following provisions, be prohibited between Member States.  
Following this process - from the reference to the Court to the latter’s carefully worded 
judgment - the steps look like this: 
 




The German Spirits Board refuses to authorise the marketing of the French liqueur, Cassis 
de Dijon, on the basis that the alcohol content does not comply with German statutory 
requirements, even though the goods are, of course, in free circulation in France.  
The importer challenges the Board’s decision in the courts, seeking administrative review of 
this decision on the basis that the treaty provision (Art. 30 EEC) has direct effect and 
provides the importer with a right not to be impeded that corresponds to the Member States’ 
obligations not to impede imports.   
 
This right, asserted by the importer (REWE) can only prevail in these circumstances 
however, if the prohibition set out in Article 30 applies to the German statutory provision 
stipulating a minimum alcohol content.  
 
If this right prevailed, as a matter of German law understood as including the obligations set 
out in Art 30, the German court would need to set aside or annul the decision of the Spirits 
Board and, in some way, ensure that the importer received the necessary authority to market 
the Cassis in Germany.  (Presumably, this would be achieved either by directing the Board 
to grant the authority to market the goods in Germany, or by setting out the law in this area, 
and thus the limits of the Board’s competence to refuse the marketing authority).    
 
Thus, one of the questions referred to the CJEU by the German court was whether the term 
‘measures having equivalent effect’ (to a quantitative restriction) was to be interpreted as 
including domestic measures that imposed a minimum alcohol content on beverages.  If the 
treaty provision were to be so interpreted, this would mean that Member States were 
prohibited from introducing such measures and certainly from applying them to goods 
originating in other Member States where that would amount to a quantitative restriction 
on the importation of such goods.  
 
The CJEU confirms that the term does include such measures and refers its preliminary 
ruling on the interpretation of EU law (ie art. 30 EEC) back to the referring domestic court.  
The ruling forms part of the judgment of the domestic court.  That court was bound by the 
EU doctrine of supremacy10 as well as that of direct effect.  The direct effect doctrine gave 
REWE the right referred to above, that corresponded to the Member States’ obligation not 
to impose quantitative restrictions and measures having equivalent effect.  The supremacy 
doctrine required the domestic court to give effect to the right under EU law in preference 
to the right (of the German Spirits Board) under German domestic law.  The domestic court 
did not rule on the validity or otherwise of the domestic measure.  That was the responsibility 
of the German Constitutional Court and Parliament.  The domestic court simply gave effect 
to the right granted to REWE as a matter of EU law, not to be subject to a measure equivalent 
in effect to a quantitative restriction.  In terms of ‘mutual recognition’, this meant, in effect, 
that Germany was required to accept, or recognise, France’s regulatory framework 
governing the production of alcoholic beverages.  
 
Recognition of this sort is consistent with the ‘Country of Origin Principle’: the principle that 
the measures and regulatory arrangements of the country of origin of a good (or service) are 
preferred to those of the country or state ‘hosting’ the goods or services in question.  This is 
‘mutual recognition’ in its ‘strongest’ form and was at the heart of Commission’s original 
draft of the EU Services Directive.  
 
Background to the EU Services Directive  
                                                          
10 Established by the CJEU in the preliminary ruling matter Case 6/64 F Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585 





The general consensus is that the EU Services Directive is one of the most significant, and 
contentious pieces of EU legislation in recent times.11  There are several reasons for this.  
First is the challenge of trying to generally regulate a range of different services with one 
instrument rather than using sector-specific measures12.  Second is the point in time in the 
evolution of the EU that this directive was being formulated: the proposed treaty 
amendments introducing a Constitution for Europe.13  Third was the resistance posed to the 
Directive by a number of interest groups, particularly trade unions and NGOs, concerned 
with the implications of the Directive for labour standards, social dumping and welfare, 
environmental and consumer interests.14   
 
In 2000, in response to a request from the Lisbon European Council, the Commission 
adopted a strategy to develop the internal market for services.  As part of this strategy, the 
Commission prepared an extensive report, setting out the existing regulatory and 
administrative barriers to further integration of the internal market for services. 15  The 
Services Directive was developed in light of this report.  No one can seriously have thought 
it would be ‘the answer’ to the problems facing integration of the internal market for services.  
However, even in its final form, the Directive makes a good start at addressing these 
obstacles.  
 
Mutual Recognition and the EU Services Directive  
 
In its initial form, the Commission’s proposal for a directive on services16 was drafted around 
the country of origin principle, anchoring the chapter dealing with the free movement of 
services.17  It is not unreasonable to suggest that the Commission was wildly optimistic if it 
considered the directive in its original form had a serious chance of success.  As an opening 
gambit however, it was certainly bold18 and radical.19  If, by the remotest of chances, the 
Commission had been successful in getting the directive through both the Council and 
Parliament in its original form then significant progress would have been made in promoting 
services integration in the EU.  If however, as surely must have been expected as the more 
likely outcome, the ‘country of origin principle’ were rejected,  whatever compromise were 
ultimately reached would be something more than the status quo.  True, it was in the end a 
                                                          
11 M. Jensen and P. Nedergaard, “From ‘Frankenstein’ to ‘toothless vampire’? Explaining the watering down of the Services 
Directive” Journal of European Public Policy Vol.19 No. 6, , pp.844 – 862, 884 citing S. Hix and A. Noury, ‘After 
Enlargement: voting patterns in the sixth European Parliament’ (2009) Vol. 34, No.2, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol.34 
No.2, May 2009, pp.159 – 174, 169; J. Flower, “Negotiating European Legislation: The Services Directive” Cambridge 
Yearbook of European Studies, Vol. 9, 2006 – 7, p. 229.    
12 Flower, ibid., p.222; C Barnard, ‘Unravelling the Services Directive’ Common Market Law Review Vol.45, 2008, pp. 323 
– 394, p.327 
13 C. Barnard, ibid., p.330; K. Nicolaïdis, ‘Trusting the Poles? Constructing Europe through Mutual Recognition’ Journal 
of European Public Policy, Vol.14 No.5, August 2007, p. 688;   
14 Flower, op.cit., ,p.223; R. Crauford Smith, ‘Old Wine in New Bottles? From the ‘Country of Origin Principle’ to the 
‘Freedom to Provide Services’ in the European Community Directive on Services in the Internal Market’ Mitchell Working 
Paper Series, 6/2007, p.2; C. Barnard, op.cit., p.329. 
15 Commission for the European Communities (2002) ‘The state of the internal market for services. Report from the 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament.’ COM (2002) 441 final, Brussels,. 5 March, 2004. See also, H. 
Badinger and N. Maydell, ‘Legal and Economic Issues in Completing the Internal Market for Services: An 
Inter694.disciplinary Perspective’ Journal of Common Market Studies Vol. 47 No. 4, pp.693 – 717. 
16 Commission (2004) ‘European Commission’s Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Services in the Internal Market’ COM (2004) 2 Final,Brussels, 25 Februrary, 2004.  
17 Chapter III, Arts. 16 – 25. 
18 K. Nikolaïdis and S. Schmidt, ‘Mutual recognition ‘on trial’: the long road to services liberalization,’ Journal of European 
Public Policy Vol. 14 No. 5, p.722. 
19 M. Jensen and P. Nedergaard, op.cit., p.857.  The authors ask whether the Commission deliberated developed ‘a radical 
proposal to have something to trade with, or did it miscalculate the positions of the various actors involved?’ 




very close call, with the Parliament ultimately brokering a compromise text20.  However, the 
hybrid provision finalised by the Parliament was indeed more than the status quo.   
 
Article 16(1) stipulated that Member States respect the right of providers to provide services 
in a Member State other than that in which they are established.  It required Member States 
to ensure free access to and exercise of a service within the host State; and prohibited them 
from imposing a range of particular restrictions on service providers from other Member 
States.   The rest of the article in effect, reserved to Member States the right nonetheless to 
introduce measures regulating access to and the exercise of a service, provided such 
measures respected the EU principles of non-discrimination, necessity and proportionality.   
 
At first glance, this arrangement might not seem that different to the situation prevailing 
prior to the entry into force of the Directive: Member States were already subject to the 
primary obligations under the treaty provisions of the TFEU moderated by the derogation 
provisions also contained in the TFEU and in the CJEU’s jurisprudence recognising Member 
State measures that are justified on the basis of an overriding public interest.   
 
Translating these obligations into an EU measure however serves at least two purposes.  
First, Member State obligations under the Directive are more specific, providing the 
Commission (as well as EU citizens) with a clearer set of criteria against which to test 
whether or not a Member State is meeting its obligations.  Second, a consequence of EU 
legislation being introduced in this field is that the Member States’ competence to legislate 
in this area as well is considerably tempered by principles of EU law.  It is also subject to 
challenge by the Commission (or another Member State) under the infringement procedures 
set out in Arts.258 and 259 respectively of the TFEU.  In other words, the cross-border trade 
in services to which the Directive applies is now regulated directly and indirectly by the 
provisions of the Directive.21 
 
Nonetheless, it might be argued that, in the end, the Directive represented only a modest 
advance, given the original ambitions of the Commission.  To accept this argument however, 
would be to underestimate the value of the negotiating experience itself.  It would also be to 
disregard the lessons learned about the challenges of gaining the trust and confidence of the 
EU citizenry in the integration process.  Notwithstanding these more diffuse lessons 
however, it is suggested that the significant advance introduced by the Directive is the 
process of ‘mutual evaluation.’   
 
Mutual Evaluation  
 
The concept of ‘mutual evaluation’ was set out in the original draft of the Directive and 
passed unscathed through the often fraught negotiations around the Directive.  The 
provision (Article 39 in the final version) was enhanced by a further paragraph.  It is 
suggested here that this process, rather than the application of the principle of mutual 
recognition, is the true innovation in furthering the economic integration of services in the 
EU.   
 
‘Mutual recognition’ is a policy instrument used for overcoming obstacles to economic 
integration that are identified behind sovereign borders.  Such obstacles are usually 
                                                          
20 See Flower, op.cit., esp. at 232ff. 
21 It is important to bear in mind that the Directive does not apply to all services. In order to have a clear sense of the 
regulatory landscape for services in the EU it is necessary to consider a number of other EU measures alongside the EU 
Services Directive.  




regulatory measures that, although applying indistinctly in law to both domestic and 
imported goods or services alike, impose a heavier burden in fact on the imported goods or 
services.  As economic integration proceeds, such obstacles are usually located ever further 
behind borders.  They are also increasingly measures less concerned with imports (whether 
of goods or services) and increasingly woven into the domestic regulatory fabric; concerned 
with responding to imperatives from other policy areas (such as environmental, consumer 
or cultural protection; industrial relations; public policy, public security or public health for 
example) and less with economic and trade concerns.  When these other policy areas provide 
a sufficient justification for the apparent obstacle, it becomes more difficult to successfully 
challenge the measure on economic grounds.  This tension is classically illustrated in the 
preliminary ruling jurisprudence of the CJEU when a Member State defends domestic 
measures on the basis either of derogation provisions in the TFEU; mandatory requirements 
(in the case of goods); or overriding reasons of public interest (in the case of services).    
 
As a consequence, it is arguably more difficult to successfully use the preliminary ruling 
mechanism to challenge a domestic measure as inconsistent with the freedom to provide 
services, if the measure can be successfully defended for overriding reasons of public interest 
(provided always of course, that the former is non-discriminatory and proportionate to the 
ends to be achieved).  As economic integration deepens it must be expected that the 
imperatives of economic policy and of trade policy will increasingly come into conflict with 
imperatives from other policy areas.  The initial stages of single market integration required 
the dismantling of regulatory measures that framed national markets; it required a 
reframing of the single market along EU borders, not Member State ones.  It must also be 
kept in mind that, at the time of the seminal preliminary ruling decisions establishing the 
doctrine of direct effect22 and supremacy23, the European Economic Community (as it then 
was) comprised only six Member States, with relatively homogenous legal and political 
systems.   
 
When the principle of mutual recognition was established24, EEC membership had only 
increased to nine.  How much easier must it have been for negative harmonisation to occur 
across nine jurisdictions that were only beginning to build a single market among 
themselves.  Fast forward nearly four decades and the EU is a far more complex creation.  
There were twenty-five Member States involved in negotiating the terms of the Services 
Directive; States with a much greater variance (in substance, if not in form) in their legal 
and political systems.  More significantly, all Member States and their citizens had had the 
benefit of seeing the consequences, both positive and negative, of measures introduced to 
further European integration and the Single Market.  In such circumstances, as already 
noted, it must surely have been unsurprising that the idea of service providers being 
governed by ‘home state’ rather than ‘host state’ regulation met with such resistance.25  
 
At the heart of this resistance was a lack of trust and confidence in the regulatory 
arrangements of ‘other’ Member States.  At its most acute, this manifested, in part, in the 
caricature of France being inundated with poorly regulated plumbers from Poland!26  The 
concerns raised during the debates around applying the ‘country of origin principle’ were 
reminiscent of many similar concerns in the past in relation to goods (British concerns for 
                                                          
22  Case 26/62 N V Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend en Loos v Netherlands Fiscal 
Administration [1963] ECR 1. 
23 Case 6/64 F Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585. 
24 Case 120/78 REWE-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein  [1979] ECR 649. 
25 See, inter alia, the discussion in A. McNaughton and Furlong, “Services Trade Reform in the European Union – the EU 
Services Directive” and J. Flower, “Negotiating European Legislation: the Services Directive.” 
26 See, eg., E. Sciolino, “Unlikely Hero in Europe’s Spat: The ‘Polish Plumber’ New York Times, 26 June, 2005.  




their sausages and prawn chips; Italian concerns for their pasta; French concerns for their 
cheeses; Danish concerns for their apples and so on).27  Common to both sets of concerns is 
a lack of trust and confidence in the ability of ‘the other’ to regulate to an acceptable 
standard.  In the case of the Services Directive, the fear, largely in the population of the ‘old’ 
Member States, was that the regulatory practices in the newer Member States (particularly, 
but not only, those admitted in the 2004 enlargement) were insufficiently rigorous and could 
not be trusted to protect the interests of service recipients in the ‘old’ Member States.  Such 
distrust cannot be resolved by a centrally imposed requirement that Member States 
mutually recognise each other’s regulatory regimes. Trust and confidence can, however, be 
fostered through dialogue and this is what the ‘mutual evaluation’ process facilitates.  
Writing in 2007, Professor Nikolaïdis examined the nature of mutual recognition, ‘blind 
trust’ and ‘binding trust’ in the process of European integration.28  In this article, she also 
introduced the concept of ‘managed mutual recognition.’29  It is suggested here that ‘mutual 
evaluation’ can also be considered as a type of ‘managed mutual recognition.’ 
 
Article 39 of the Services Directive sets out the obligations of the Member States and the 
Commission in relation to the mutual evaluation process.  The process is more clearly 
established in relation to service providers seeking to establish themselves in a Member 
State other than their own.  In relation to providers who wish to provide services 
transnationally within the EU from their home State, the process is more embryonic.  In 
relation to services, there have always been two aspects to this fundamental freedom: the 
freedom to provide services30  and the freedom to establish in another Member State.31  
Freedom of establishment is dealt with in Articles 9 – 15 of Chapter III of the Directive.  The 
Free movement of services is dealt with in Articles 16 – 21 of Chapter IV of the Directive.  
The changes to Article 16 (referred to above) also resulted in the expansion of Article 39 to 
include paragraph 5, discussed below.  
 
Mutual Evaluation of Requirements Relating to Establishment  
 
By 28 December, 2009, (ie., the end of the transition period for implementing the 
obligations of the Directive) each Member State was required to present to the Commission 
a report containing information specified in the following provisions of the Directive:Article 
9(2) on authorisation schemes; Article 15(5), on requirements to be evaluated;Article 25(3), 
on multidisciplinary activities. 
   
The information required was essentially the same: first, to set out what measures a Member 
State had in place for regulating the conduct of service providers from other Member States.  
Second, to show that such measures are proportionate; non-discriminatory; and can be 
justified for an overriding reason of public interest.  The Commission was then required to 
distribute these reports to the Member States who had six months to submit to the 
Commission, their observations on the reports.  In the meantime, the Commission was 
required to consult ‘interested parties’ on the reports.  In other words, the Member States 
were to evaluate each other’s regulatory measures and the justifications for such measures.  
While they were doing this, the Commission was, in effect, consulting with those affected by 
the measures on which the Member States were reporting.  
                                                          
27 See, eg., “Why Brussels Sprouts” The Economist, 26 December, 1992, p.70. 
28 K. Nikolaïdis, ‘Trusting the Poles? Constructing Europe through mutual recognition,’ op.cit. 
29 Ibid., p.685. 
30 Now dealt with under Articles 56 – 62 of Chapter 3, Services, in Title IV, Free Movement of Persons, Services and Capital.   
31 Now dealt with under Articles 49 – 55 of Chapter 2, Right of Establishment, in Title IV, Free Movement of Persons, 
Services and Capital.   





The Commission is assisted in this process by a Committee, established for the purpose 
under Article 40 of the Directive.  The Commission submits the reports, and the Member 
States’ observations to the Committee for its observations.  (Presumably, the Committee is 
also provided with a report from the Commission concerning its stakeholder consultations).  
By 28 December, 2010 at the latest, the Commission was required to present a summary 
report to the European Parliament and the Council, taking into account the observations 
made by the Member States and the Committee.  This summary report was also to be 
accompanied, where appropriate, by proposals for additional initiatives.  In January, 2011, 
the Commission published the initial results of the mutual evaluation process, together with 
suggestions for additional measures aimed at continuing the integration process.32  The 
following year, the Commission published a communication on the implementation of the 
Services Directive.33  This was accompanied by three extensive Staff Working Documents34  
These documents, taken as a whole, satisfy the reporting requirements set out in Arts. 39 
and 41 of the Services Directive.  
 
Mutual Evaluation of Requirements Relating to the Free Movement of 
Services  
 
Apart from the reports referred to above, Member States were also required to report to the 
Commission on similar measures in relation to the free movement of services and to show 
that such measures are proportionate; non-discriminatory; and can be justified for an 
overriding reason of public interest.  Member States are also required thereafter, to advise 
the Commission of any changes to such requirements, including any new requirements, 
together with the reasons for them.   
 
Whereas in relation to measures concerning establishment, Member States are required 
under the Directive to make observations on each other’s arrangements, there is no such 
requirement in relation to the free movement of services.  Rather, the Commission advises 
all other Member States of any such changes in requirements as advised.  The former is also 
required ‘to provide analyses and orientations on the application of these provisions in the 
context of the Directive.’35  Given the controversy around the passage of the Directive, it is 
unsurprising that the evaluation process around the free movement of services is more 
nascent than that concerning establishment.  
 
Both the European Parliament and the Council have responded positively to the mutual 
evaluation process with each institution endorsing it for use in other policy areas, where 
                                                          
32 Commission of the European Union (2011) ‘Communication from the Commission: Towards a better functioning Single 
Market for Services – building on the results of the mutual evaluation process of the Services Directive’ COM (2011) 20 
Final, Brussels, 27 January, 2011; Commission of the European Union (2011) ‘Commission Staff Working Document: 
Detailed information on the implementation of Directive 2006/123/EC on Services in the Internal Market’ SEC(2011) 102 
Final, Brussels, 27 January, 2011. 
33 Commission of the European Union (2012) ‘Communication from the Commission on the implementation of the Services 
Directive: A partnership for new growth in services 2012 – 2015’ COM (2012) 261, Final Brussels, 8 June, 2012. 
34 Commission of the European Union (2012), ‘Commission Staff Working Document with a view to establishing guidance 
on the application of Article 20(2) of Directive 2006/123/EC on services in the internal market (‘the Services Directive’) 
SWD(2012) 146 Final, Brussels, 8 June, 2012;  Commission of the European Union (2012), ‘Commission Staff Working 
Document on the result of the performance checks of the internal market for services (construction, business services and 
tourism) SWD(2012) 147 Final, Brussels, 8 June, 2012;  Commission of the European Union (2012), ‘Commission Staff 
Working Document Detailed information on the implementation of Directive 2006/123/EC on services in the internal 
Market SWD(2012) 148 Final, Brussels, 8 June, 2012; 
35 Article 39(5). 




appropriate. 36   Consistent with this exhortation, the Commission included a mutual 
evaluation process in the most recent amendment to the Professional Qualifications 
Directive.37  In its current published form however, this Directive does not in fact give proper 
effect to the mutual evaluation process.  Due almost certainly to a typographical error during 
version revisions, the Commission is only required to circulate reports from Member States 
on measures they have removed or made less stringent.38  Directive 2013/55/EU amends 
the provisions of Directive 2005/36/EC.  At paragraph 7 of the amended article 59 of the 
Professional Qualifications Directive (2005/36/EC), the Commission is required to forward 
reports referred to in paragraph 6.  That paragraph refers only to reports of measures that 
have been removed or made less stringent; not to measures that remain in force and are 
justified by the relevant Member State as compatible with EU law.  In the Commission’s 
original proposal, the Commission was required to forward to Member States information 
on both sets of measures: those retained with justifications and those removed or made less 
stringent.39  Paragraph 5 of amended article 59 requires Member States to provide the 
Commission with information on these measures by 18 January, 2016.  It is to be hoped that 
the error in paragraph 7 will be rectified sooner rather than later, ensuring that the mutual 




The Directive provides a model for dialogue among Member States in relation to different 
national requirements in respect of the establishment provisions in Chapter III; and the 
basis for developing further discussions in relation to the free movement of services dealt 
with in Chapter IV.  The mutual evaluation provision establishes a process specifically for 
dialogue in relation to harmonising the regulatory environment in services across the EU.  
It is freely acknowledged that integrating the services market in the EU is a complex process.  
It is also an ongoing one.  However, it is suggested that the mutual evaluation process is 
consistent with the underlying ethos of the EU itself: when people are talking, they are not 
warring.  If Member States, and their citizens, are talking about the similarities and 
differences in services regulation across the EU, trust and confidence in one another must 
inevitably grow, even if only slowly.   
 
An analysis of these reports and the responses of the EU institutions must wait for another 
occasion. Similarly, it will take some time before it is possible to assess the extent to which 
the mutual evaluation process has effected harmonising changes in the regulatory patterns 
of the Member States.  However it is reasonable to hope that the process will lead to a more 
nuanced and sophisticated harmonising process the EU services sector and beyond. 
                                                          
36 European Parliament, ‘European Parliament Resolution on the Mutual Evaluation Process of the Services Directive’ 
[2011] OJ C131/46  Brussels, 25 October 2011; Council of the European Union, ‘Conclusions on a better functioning Single 
Market for services – mutual evaluation process of the Services Directive’ 3074th Competitiveness  (Internal Market, 
Industry, Research and Space) Council meeting, Brussels, 10 March, 2011. 
37 European Parliament and the Council of the European Union (2013) ‘Directive 2013/55/EU of the European Parliament 
and the Council of 20 November, 2013 amending Directive 2005/36/EC on the recognition of professional qualifications 
and Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012 on administrative cooperation through the Internal Market Information System (‘the 
IMI Regulation’) OJ (2013) L354/132  
38 See Article 1(49) Professional Qualifications Directive (2013/55/EU) which amends art.59 of the original Directive.      
39  See Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive amending Directive 2005/36/EC on the recognition of professional 
qualifications and Regulation on administrative cooperation through the Internal Market Information System’ COM(2011) 
883 Final, Brussels, 19 December, 2011.  The original version of the amendment to article 59 is set out at para.48 of the 
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This article examines continuity and change in the European Union’s interactions with the Association of South East 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) with regard to Myanmar. As the EU has used its connections with ASEAN to raise its concerns 
around Myanmar, the Association’s behaviour also comes into focus. This investigation is linked to the evolution of the 
EU in world affairs via its political ties to ASEAN. It concentrates on the rather abrupt change introduced by the reform 
process launched in 2011-12, which marked the beginning of a new phase. The EU’s concern that the Myanmar issue not 
destabilise its relations with ASEAN has remained constant, however changes in the dialogue can be seen as forming 
three distinct phases. It is maintained that the aspiration to escape from pervasive China and the desirability of 
attracting new partners were the catalyst for these changes. Official documents from the EU, the European Commission, 
and European Council Conclusions and Common Positions, declarations issued at ASEAN, Asia-Europe and other 
meetings, together with secondary sources and interviews conducted mostly in Myanmar, contribute to this work. While 
many scholars have hinted at the extent to which the issue of Myanmar has been problematic to the EU-ASEAN links, 
there has been no emphasis on the positive effect that Myanmar has had on EU-ASEAN relations. This research 
illuminates the extent to which this issue has conversely helped to reinforce the long-lasting EU-ASEAN relationship.   
 




The Republic of the Union of Myanmar has recently generated increasing attention among 
scholars and observers alike.3 The 2011-12 reform process, the 2012 by-elections and the 
transfer of power to a civilian, military-sponsored government marked abrupt changes. 
President Thein Sein (a former general, Prime Minister since 2007, and President since 
March 2011) appeares to be the architect of the transformation. The by-elections resulted in 
a landslide victory for the government’s opposition party, the National League for 
Democracy (NLD), led by Nobel Peace laureate, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Sein’s government 
released a number of political prisoners, concluded ceasefire arrangements with armed 
groups in the ethnic regions, signed peace agreements, made efforts to eliminate the use of 
                                                          
1 The shortened pen-name ‘Marchi’ is used in the text and references. 
2 A first version of this article was prepared for the 2013 EUSA AP Annual Conference, Macau, 17-18 May, ‘Reassessing the 
EU-Asia Pacific Relationship in the context of the EU crisis.’ The author thanks the participants, John Leslie and Pascaline 
Winand, and also the participants in the discussion of this last version, in January 2014, at Singapore Management 
University, School of Social Science, in particular Paul Evans, Clara Portela and William Tov, and ANZJES’ anonymous 
reviewers for their constructive comments.     
3  For the country profile, see the EC/Burma/Myanmar Strategy Paper (2007-2013), pp. 5-46. 
<http://eeas.europa.eu/myanmar/csp/07_13_en.pdf>, accessed 19 September 2013.  





forced labour, recognised labourers’ right to strike, and amended the censorship laws.4 In 
January 2013, an international conference was organized in Myanmar, at which the Sein 
government’s timetable for reform over the next three years was unveiled. Yet, the 
government is facing challenges including the need to reform the Constitution, which 
preserves the military’s supremacy over the Cabinet and Parliament 5  as it places the 
National Defence and Security Council above the hluttaw, the Burmese Parliament, with 10 
of its 11 members being officers or former officers.6 Sein’s restructuring has been unmatched 
by any previous government leadership since the coup d’état of 1962. The latter brought to 
power a military junta (under the official name of the State Peace and Development Council, 
SPDC, successively changed into the State Law and Order Restoration Council, SLORC, and 
again into the SPDC) which ruled the country until 2011. The SLORC/SPDC suppressed 
domestic dissent and exercised absolute power, despite 20 years of sanctions imposed by 
the EU and other international actors. The new developments have been acknowledged by 
the EU as ‘historic improvements,’ 7  and as ‘a significant step towards further 
democratisation in Myanmar’ by the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).8 
ASEAN is the regional group of which Myanmar has been a member since 1997. Within 
ASEAN, the European Union raised its concerns about Myanmar and ‘encouraged positive 
changes.’9   
 
The transformations in Myanmar gave way to a new phase in the relations with the European 
Union. The European Council suspended the visa ban on cabinet members and other high 
ranking officials in 2011, and placed Myanmar under the Everything but Arms (EBA) regime. 
High Representative Ashton opened a EU Office in Yangon, which was later upgraded to a 
Delegation. The European Union has more than doubled the development aid  (to about 150 
million euros for 2012-13), explored the feasibility of a bilateral investment agreement, and 
reinstated the system of generalised tariff preferences with Yangon in mid 2013. It expanded 
bilateral trade with Myanmar (226.37 million dollars in 2012) as well as Myanmar’s exports 
to the EU (43.54 million dollars) and imports from the EU (182.83 million dollars),10 all of 
which are vital to Myanmar (with a GDP of US$ 876 in 2010).11 It allocated initial funds to 
the Myanmar Peace Centre in Yangon (EUR 700,000) in 2012, and further contributed EUR 
30 million in 2013 to the ethnic peace process.12 It has agreed to the building up of a lasting 
EU-Myanmar partnership.13 To turn commitments into reality, a joint Task Force met in 
Myanmar in November 2013,14 following the first Myanmar-EU Forum in Nay Pyi Taw in 
                                                          
4 Council conclusions, 3159th Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, Luxemburg, 23 April 2012. Censorship laws, however, still 
exist and are enacted; see: T. Myint-U, ‘Help Myanmar’s peace talks to transform Asia,’ Financial Times, 22 November 
2013.  
5 Myanmar’s military (the Tatmadaw) is constitutionally protected and exempted from civilian oversight. Article 20(b) of 
the Constitution gives the military complete authority over the ministries of defence, interior and border affairs, as it 
appoints all three ministers. Article 109(b) and 141(b) reserve 25 % of parliamentary seats for the military, which in effect 
gives them a veto over any attempts to alter the Constitution because of the supermajority required for revision. D. Tonkin, 
EastAsiaForum, 3 May, 2013.  
6  A. MacDonald, EastAsiaForum, 1st May, 2013. <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/05/01/the-tatmadaws-new-
position-in-myanmar-politics/>, accessed 19 September 2013.  
7 Council Conclusions, 23 April 2012. 
8 Chairman’s Statement, 20th ASEAN Summit, Phnom Penh, 2012, (paragr. 87). ASEAN is formed by Indonesia, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, which are the five founding states, to which later Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar 
and Cambodia also joined, totaling ten members.  
9 EEAS Myanmar,<http://eeas.europe.eu/myanmar/index en.htm>, accessed 14 November 2012. 
10  Myanmar, EU agrees to use forum to advance ties. 20 June 2013. <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/790343. 
shtml#.UdrvwpX3AfE>, accessed 19 September 2013.  
11 United Nations, National Accounts Main Aggregates Database, <http://unstats.un.org/>, accessed 19 September 2013.   
12 European Commission, IP/12/1167.   
13  Joint statement, Brussels, 5 March 2013, EUCO 58/13. <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data 
/docs/pressdata/en/ec/135830.pdf>, accessed 19 September 2013.  
14 <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-176_en.htm> accessed 19 September 2013.   
